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Three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of nature are discussed: Humean 
Supervenience, nomic necessitation, and scientific/dispositional essentialism. These views are 
examined especially with regard to their take on the apparent modal force of laws and their ability 
to explain that modal force. It will be suggested that none of the three views, at least in their 
strongest form, can be maintained if some laws are metaphysically necessary, but others are 
metaphysically contingent. Some reasons for thinking that such variation in the modal status of laws 
exists will be presented with reference to physics. This drives us towards a fourth, hybrid view, 
according to which there are both necessary and contingent laws. The prospects for such a view are 
studied. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There are three popular views regarding the modal status of the laws of nature: the Humean 
Supervenience (HS) approach originating in Lewis’s work (e.g. 1986), the nomic necessitation 
approach primarily familiar from Armstrong’s (as well as Dretske’s and Tooley’s) work (e.g. 
Armstrong 1983), and the scientific/dispositional essentialist approach defended, for instance, by 
Ellis (2001; Ellis and Lierse 1994) and Bird (2007).1 All of these views come in many varieties, and 
there are also alternative approaches, such as Mumford’s (2004) lawlessness approach, Lowe’s 
(2006) essentialist approach, and Maudlin’s (2007) primitivism about laws. The following question 
regarding Modal Force (MF) is central to all of these approaches: 
 
 (MF)  How can one explain the apparent modal force that distinguishes genuine laws from 
  mere regularities? 
 
Any complete account of the metaphysics of laws should be able to explain the apparent modal 
force presupposed by (MF). But it is not altogether clear what would count as a satisfactory 
explanation. In fact, one problem in the extensive literature concerning laws derives exactly from 
the very different criteria that philosophers demand from a satisfactory explanation of the modal 
force of laws. The preliminary hypothesis of this paper is that the different criteria can all be useful 
– even correct – but they correspond to different types of laws. In other words, the mistake has been 
to search for a uniform account. 
In their strongest form, each of the three popular views falls to one or the other end of the 
extreme regarding the modal status of laws i.e. either all laws are contingent or all laws are 
necessary.2 From the viewpoint of Humeanism, laws are thoroughly contingent, mere regularities 
that could have been different, yet ‘supervene on particular matters of fact’ (Beebee 2000: 572). 
1  See Beebee (2000) for a helpful comparison between the first two views. 
2 There are some caveats. For instance, Hendry and Rowbottom (2009) argue that (permissive) scientific/dispositional 
essentialism is compatible with interworld variation in a property’s dispositional profile, hence giving room for 
slight variation in laws of nature. Regardless, I will focus on versions of scientific/dispositional essentialism that 
defend the necessity of all laws. By way of justification, Bird (2007: 48 ff.) takes it that consistent dispositional 
essentialists should be committed to the necessity of all laws – the alternative would be an ‘untidy metaphysics, with 
two classes of laws’ (p. 49). 
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According to scientific/dispositional essentialism, laws are metaphysically necessary, intimately 
related to the essential properties of the things they concern. Very roughly, this difference may be 
considered to concern the origin or source of laws: either they originate in the random arrangement 
of things or they flow from essential properties. 
The nomic necessitation approach has a somewhat misleading name, as it is in fact at the 
contingent end of the spectrum. However, Armstrong would not be happy with either of the two 
mentioned options regarding the origin of laws, for he states that the idea of nomic necessitation is 
exactly that we can distinguish laws from mere regularities, contra Lewis (Armstrong 1997: 223). 
Yet, nomic necessitation does not directly concern metaphysical necessity, which is what the 
mentioned spectrum of the two extremes is supposed to capture.3 To be perfectly clear about this, 
here is a helpful passage from Bird:4 
 
Armstrong wants to capture the idea that nomic necessitation has some kind of modal 
force – not the ‘hard’ kind associated with full-on metaphysical necessity, but a ‘soft’ 
kind associated with nomic modality (including explanatory force and the ability to 
support counterfactuals) and consistent with metaphysical contingency. (Bird 2005: 148.) 
 
Both Armstrong’s nomic necessitation approach and the Humean branch reject the view that 
laws have modal force of the ‘hard’ variety. In this limited sense, we can lump them together when 
we examine whether a plausible account of the apparent modal force of the laws of nature is 
available. A comprehensive – or even fair – treatment of Humean Supervenience and the Best 
System Analysis would certainly require a paper of its own. But since such an analysis is not central 
to the argument of this paper, I will instead just outline the similarities between (some versions of) 
HS and the nomic necessitation approach. 
If we apply Lewis’s (1986: ix) traditional characterisation of HS to laws, we can understand 
the Humean view as stating that the laws of nature supervene on the totality of local matters of 
particular fact (Bird 2007: 82). There is a particular aspect typical to many variations of HS which 
is of special interest to us.5 This aspect is related to a view about properties called categoricalism, 
or, as Bird (2007: 66) calls it, categorical monism: all sparse/fundamental properties are categorical 
(as opposed to dispositional). The Humean approach holds that fundamental properties do not have 
essential causal powers, or indeed any essential features. Hence, properties are also devoid of 
immanent modality. More generally, categorical properties do not ‘metaphysically necessitate 
anything about property instantiations in wholly distinct regions’ (Loewer 2012: 116). Bird thinks 
that a commitment to categoricalism, which is shared by the Armstrong-type nomic necessitation 
and the Humean approach to laws, is problematic: 
 
The categoricalist view denies that there are potencies or indeed any other kind of 
modality immanent in regularities—the Humean Supervenience thesis says that they 
merely supervene on the distribution of categorical properties among particulars (and 
furthermore nothing explains that distribution). (Bird 2007: 90.) 
3  In fact, some nomic necessitation accounts (e.g. Swoyer 1982) do consider all laws to be metaphysically necessary, 
but the original Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley account was certainly in favour of metaphysically contingent laws. 
4 Some, like Hendry and Rowbottom (2009), seem to conflate nomic necessitation and dispositional essentialism, 
claiming that both are committed to the metaphysical necessity of laws. As the quotation from Bird makes clear, this 
does not reflect Armstrong’s (original) version of nomic necessitation. See also Schrenk’s (2011) discussion on 
Armstrong and nomic necessitation. 
5  See Earman and Roberts (2005a, 2005b) for some discussion of the various formulations of HS and an attempt at 
and defence of a better formulation. There are no doubt better and worse formulations of HS out there, but I take it 
that a core corollary of HS is that there is no modality immanent in laws, that is, any modality that we associate with 
laws is a supervenient feature of the Humean mosaic. 
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 According to the categoricalist view, laws are contingent regularities that concern 
categorical properties. Since a commitment to categoricalism is typical both for HS and the nomic 
necessitation view, the scientific/dispositional essentialist might hope to refute both views with the 
same argument against categoricalism, building on Bird (2005). Evidence in favour of immanent 
modality in at least some regularities should be enough. In the course of this paper, some evidence 
for such modal content will be presented. Hence, in partial agreement with Bird, the hypothesis of 
this paper is that Armstrong’s ‘soft’ modal force cannot be enough, at least not for all laws. Given 
this acknowledgement, my starting point is evidently closer to the scientific/dispositional 
essentialist line than the HS or the nomic necessitation approach. Therefore, even though the 
positive argument that will be presented is not directly concerned with any of the mentioned views 
about laws, a type of essentialist position will be adopted for the sake of argument. The suggestion 
is that the truth of the matter lies somewhere between the two extremes: laws are not mere random 
regularities or subject only to nomic necessitation, nor are they (all) metaphysically necessary. This 
leaves open the possibility that some laws are contingent and some are necessary – a ‘mixed’ view. 
Such a view is explicitly denied by Bird (e.g. 2007: 48 ff.), who gives priority to a unified account.6 
But the view to be presented is not strictly a mix of scientific/dispositional essentialism and the 
Humean or nomic necessitation view, but rather a fourth view distinct from the three popular views, 
although partly inspired by Lowe’s (2006) essentialist line. Such a hybrid view bears some 
resemblance with other recent accounts, such as Maudlin (2007), Roberts (2008), Hendry and 
Rowbottom (2009) and Lange (2009, 2011). 
I do not have the space to discuss other hybrid views in detail; instead I will focus on 
offering further support for one version of the hybrid view. Of the mentioned views, I believe that 
Hendry and Rowbottom (2009) come closest to what I have in mind.7 Their view is a type of 
(permissive) dispositional essentialism. While I agree with their starting point, namely that anti-
quidditism does not entail nomic necessitation (2009: 669), I am more doubtful about a key element 
in their positive proposal. This element is the (primitive) similarity between sets of dispositions – or 
dispositional profiles of properties. According to quidditism, the identity of properties is brute: mass 
and charge, say, could exchange all their dispositional features without losing their identity; they 
have something like a haecceity which secures their identity regardless of their dispositional 
features. Hendry and Rowbottom, like many others, regard this view to be incredible. Instead, they 
take the complete dispositional profile of any given property to be vague (2009: 674). The question 
is, just how vague can the dispositional profile be? If no answer is given, the view runs the risk of 
having to return to some type of quidditism after all – not of individual dispositions, but of the 
dispositional profiles themselves.  
While I am not fully convinced by the line of argument from Hendry and Rowbottom, there 
is an important connection between our accounts. The view that I will present could perhaps be 
understood as a type of ‘weak’ dispositional essentialism, as opposed to the ‘permissive’ type due to 
Hendry and Rowbottom as well as the ‘strict’ type that Ellis, among others, defends. Permissive 
dispositional essentialism is anti-quidditist: a property’s identity is determined by its dispositional 
profile or causal role. But it is also supposed be compatible with ‘moderate’ interworld variation in 
a property’s dispositional profile. One important difference between permissive dispositional 
essentialism and weak dispositional essentialism of the type that I am about to develop is that 
whereas the former emerges simply from the idea that there could be slight variation in the 
dispositional profiles of properties, the latter goes some way towards explaining what might enable 
6 Swoyer (1982: 211) is also hostile towards such ‘intermediate’ positions. Roberts (2010), on the other hand, argues 
that the scientific/dispositional essentialists are stuck with an ‘untidy’ mixed view because at least some laws turn 
out to be contingent. 
7  Thanks to an anonymous referee for The Philosophical Quarterly for inviting me to explore the connection to 
Hendry and Rowbottom in more detail. 
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this variation. Keinänen, in contrasting Ellis’s view with that of Hendry and Rowbottom, makes a 
similar observation, suggesting that ‘The best way to develop “a weak dispositionalist style” variant 
of Ellis’s position is to assume that the exact values of certain natural constants (e.g. the 
gravitational constant) are contingent’ (2011: 423, fn9). As it turns out, this is exactly the strategy 
that I will follow, albeit focusing on the contingency of the fine structure constant rather than the 
gravitational constant. 
Partly for dialectical reasons and partly for reasons that I have explored elsewhere (Tahko 
forthcoming), I will also adopt a view which is a core commitment for Lowe: natural kind 
fundamentalism, i.e. the thesis that there are genuine natural kinds and they form a fundamental 
ontological category (see Bird and Tobin 2012: section 1.3). This type of view is defended both by 
Lowe and Ellis, and indeed it would be possible to develop the argument from Ellis’s point of view 
as well. Moreover, note that this assumption is not in fact necessary for the task of developing a 
hybrid view about laws. My choice to adopt it is largely based on personal preference as I consider 
the connection between laws and kinds to be an important one. In any case, the view contrasts with 
Armstrong’s approach, which does not posit a distinct category (of universal) for natural kinds, even 
though Armstrong thinks that kinds ‘mark true joints in nature’ (Armstrong 1997: 67). So, the view 
being developed here is sympathetic to natural kind fundamentalism as developed by Lowe and 
Ellis, but it differs from their versions in some important respects (which will become clear below). 
To sum up, the two primary claims that will be put forward are: 
 
(1) There is a middle ground between the two extreme views about the modal status of 
laws: a hybrid view, according to which some laws are contingent and some laws are 
necessary. 
 
(2) The distinction between laws that feature fundamental natural kinds and laws that do not 
feature kinds reflects the distinction between metaphysically necessary and 
metaphysically contingent laws.  
  
The primary contribution of the paper concerns (2). As has been noted, various hybrid views about 
laws have been developed in the literature, but for the most part, I do not share the motivation 
behind these views. At any rate, there is more to be said about what explains the different modal 
status of laws. The next section examines exactly this – the apparent modal force presupposed by 
the initial question of the paper (MF). Some illustrative cases that may give support to (1) will also 
be discussed. In the third section, a critical assessment of Lowe’s essentialist approach and the 
connection between laws and natural kinds is provided. A solution to some of the problems 
regarding Lowe’s account is suggested, building on (2). The fourth and fifth sections concern 
potential examples of contingent and necessary laws in light of physics, respectively – both (1) and 
(2) will receive further support in these sections. A concluding section follows. 
 
II. THE APPARENT MODAL FORCE OF LAWS 
The initial question of this paper (MF) presupposes an apparent modal force that distinguishes 
genuine laws from mere regularities. As has been noted, it is not easy to make progress regarding 
this distinction. But something ought to be said about the source of the modal force of laws. Since I 
have proposed to adopt a type of essentialist view at least for the sake of argument, we can start 
with the idea that there are certain entities, the natures of which give rise to the causal powers that 
these entities manifest. In this type of account, one might suggest that it is essential that two 
particles with opposite charges attract each other. This regularity, according to the essentialist view, 
will hold in all metaphysically possible worlds. But this does not yet answer the original question, 
i.e. what is the source of the modal force of laws. Importantly, it seems that here we can make a 
4 
distinction between what holds in virtue of the essences of, say, charged particles and what makes it 
the case that the law(s) governing charged particles hold across all metaphysically possible worlds – 
if they indeed do. In other words, the essentialist story about fundamental properties such as charge 
that may explain certain regularities holding across metaphysically possible worlds is 
distinguishable from the claim that the more general laws governing the behaviour of charged 
particles hold across metaphysically possible worlds. We could agree that certain regularities hold 
across metaphysically possible worlds, for instance, particles with like charges repel each other. 
However, it is making an additional commitment to say that the essentialist story about charge 
makes it the case that all laws governing charged particles hold in the same worlds. For instance, 
perhaps there is room for variation in the magnitude of the electrostatic interaction, which would 
also entail changes for other regularities (such as bonding behaviour).8 
As a test case, take the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP), which states that no two fermions 
in a closed system can occupy the same quantum state at the same time. For example, two distinct 
electrons in an atom cannot have all the same quantum numbers at the same time. The PEP has 
numerous important implications. One of them is said to pertain to the space-occupying behaviour 
of all matter (we will return to this). But let’s first consider a simpler case, namely the forming of 
ionic bonds, such as the bond between sodium and chlorine in sodium chloride molecules. The 
Pauli Exclusion Principle illustrates the important role of the balance in the repulsion and attraction 
between Na+ and Cl– ions. As the ions come closer – as required by the regularity of opposite 
charges attracting – and the wavefunctions of their electrons overlap, the PEP further requires that 
these electrons cannot occupy the same quantum state. The situation is resolved by a change in the 
energy levels of the electrons so that no two identical electrons occupy the same quantum state. This 
results in Pauli repulsion, which prevents the ions from coming any closer together. The product is 
a stable sodium chloride molecule. 
The PEP expresses a regularity which appears to be central to the behaviour of all material 
objects; it underlies the ability of molecules to form bonds and subatomic particles to form atoms. 
Typically, when we consider something like the ability of sodium and chloride ions to form bonds, 
we state the highest order law that seems relevant. In this case, the most relevant law would seem to 
be Coulomb’s law, which states that like charges repel and unlike charges attract.9 Since Na+ and 
Cl– ions have opposite polarity, they are apt to bond and form sodium chloride molecules. With 
regard to the PEP and Coulomb’s law, it may be noted that the former is rather more general than 
the latter.  
Coulomb’s law is a popular example in the literature, but the PEP less so. For instance, Bird 
(2007: 199) is rather hesitant about the PEP, suggesting that since Pauli’s original conviction was 
that the principle must have an explanation within quantum mechanics, it does not state a 
relationship that is ‘close to’ fundamental, which Bird takes to be a necessary condition for laws. 
But as we will see, there are reasons to think that the PEP does state a relationship that is ‘close to’ 
fundamental, even if it can be given a further explanation in quantum mechanics – the 
‘fundamentality’ of a given relationship is a rather arbitrary notion in this discussion. What we will 
turn to now is the suggestion that fundamental natural kinds are central to the modal force of laws. 
 
 
8  I owe a great debt to an anonymous referee for The Philosophical Quarterly for helping me formulate this idea more 
clearly. 
9  Following Mumford (2004: 138), one might think that there is a difference in the status of the PEP and Coloumb’s 
law since the former is not called a law whereas the latter is – considerations like this and the fact that science does 
not offer us a conclusive list of laws lead Mumford (2004: Ch. 8) to conclude that laws do not form a natural kind 
(in Ellis’s sense). However, as Bird (2007: 198) has pointed out, that something is not called a ‘law’ does not mean 
that it is not a law of nature. 
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III. LAWS AND KINDS 
The suggestion that fundamental natural kinds are central to the modal force of laws is the core of 
E.J. Lowe’s account of laws, which partly motivates the view being developed in this paper. Lowe 
suggests that if we abandon the categoricalist view, we can offer a more satisfactory explanation of 
the modal force of laws. Lowe’s strategy is based on his four-category ontology – the correctness of 
which I wish to remain neutral about. But there are some aspects of his account that are helpful for 
the view being developed here. Here is an illustrative passage: 
 
What I can say […] is that the uniformities in question [concerning the powers and 
liabilities of electrons] are explained by the fact that electrons are all particular instances 
of the same fundamental natural kind, which is governed by a number of laws linking this 
kind with certain attributes. And I can explain the absence of other regularly occurring 
combinations of powers and liabilities in terms of the non-existence of any kinds of 
particle governed by suitable laws. (Lowe 2006: 161.) 
 
 Lowe proposes that we should explain laws in terms of the natures of natural kinds. For 
instance, it is supposedly a part of the nature of the kind ‘electron’ that its instances have unit 
negative charge. This particular essentialist fact (partly) explains certain regularities, such as the net 
negative charge of chloride ions. Similarly, it is a part of the nature of the kind ‘fermions’ that two 
fermions in a closed system cannot occupy the same quantum state at the same time, as the PEP 
states. This analysis also applies to the famous example about the universal lack of solid spheres of 
gold or uranium of a mile in diameter. According to Lowe (2006: 157), the case of uranium 
constitutes a law because it stems from the nature of the element uranium, whereas there is nothing 
in the nature of the element gold that would rule out solid spheres of gold a mile in diameter. 
 Promising as Lowe’s line may seem, Bird (2012: 97–9) has recently challenged this type of 
approach to laws, arguing that Lowe’s analysis breaks down in cases such as Coulomb’s law, which 
does not seem to feature any fundamental natural kinds.10 The problem is that if all laws are 
explained in terms of kinds, then it seems that Lowe would have to postulate a natural kind which is 
governed by Coulomb’s law. Since Coulomb’s law applies to all material objects, the kind in 
question would have to be all-encompassing – a peculiar kind indeed.11 Bird’s central point is that 
some laws do not seem to feature fundamental natural kinds, hence Lowe’s analysis cannot apply to 
them. 
 A potential line of reply for Lowe would be to suggest that there is, after all, a perfectly 
familiar type of kind that Coulomb’s law can be associated with, namely, material body.12 Even 
though ‘material body’ would be a rather general kind, it is certainly a very familiar one: Newton’s 
laws of motion explicitly refer to such bodies exerting forces and being subjected to forces. But 
10 This usage of ‘fundamental’ should not be confused with a fundamental ontological category. Lowe (2006: 8) 
defines a fundamental ontological category as follows: ‘the existence and identity conditions of entities belonging to 
that category cannot be exhaustively specified in terms of ontological dependency relations between those entities 
and entities belonging to other categories’. Recall that, for Lowe, natural kinds constitute one of the four 
fundamental ontological categories. But what Lowe seems to have in mind when he talks about ‘fundamental natural 
kinds’ in this connection is ‘fundamental’ in the sense of ‘elementary’ or ‘basic’, e.g. electrons are thought to be 
fundamental particles and hence a fundamental (basic, simple) natural kind (Lowe 2006: 154). 
11 Admittedly, scientific essentialists, like Ellis, might argue that Coulomb’s law involves higher-order determinable 
natural kinds, even if no fundamental natural kinds. However, this reply would not seem to be available to Lowe, 
who avoids the determinate-determinable distinction and states that: ‘The form of a law, in the simplest case, is just 
this, on my view: substantial kind K is characterized by Fness, or, even more simply, K is F’ (p. 132). For Lowe, a 
metaphysically necessary law must feature a fundamental natural kind, and Coulomb’s law does not appear to 
satisfy this requirement – this will be discussed in more detail below. On this, see also Wilson’s (2012) recent paper, 
which defends the existence of fundamental determinables. 
12  Lowe has suggested this reply in discussion. 
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even if we were to accept that ‘material body’ is a natural kind, there are still more general laws that 
do not seem to feature any kinds, such as the conservation laws. Unless we are willing to go out on 
a limb and insist that physical systems, quite generally, constitute a natural kind, then it appears that 
the connection between kinds and laws required by Lowe is not forthcoming. 
 But perhaps there is a simple explanation for the apparent disjointness of laws and kinds. 
Here is one possibility: the distinction between laws that feature fundamental natural kinds and laws 
that do not feature kinds reflects the distinction between metaphysically necessary and 
metaphysically contingent laws. Lowe himself has not entertained this type of reply, and it is 
doubtful that he would find it appealing. There are at least two reasons why this reply conflicts with 
Lowe’s view. Firstly, it entails that if there are only very few metaphysically necessary laws, then it 
may be possible to account for those laws with the help of only very few genuine natural kinds, 
contrary to what Lowe seems to think.13 Secondly, and more importantly, Lowe leaves room for 
metaphysically contingent laws which do feature natural kinds. Nevertheless, the line is worth 
pursuing for it enables us to salvage what is perhaps the most fruitful aspect of Lowe’s account, 
namely, distinguishing between contingent law-like regularities and metaphysically necessary laws. 
There may be alternative solutions available for the scientific/dispositional essentialist, but the 
scientific/dispositional essentialist will, in turn, have difficulties accommodating the apparent 
contingency of some laws, as will be argued in the next section. 
 Why should we think that laws could come in two different varieties in the first place? Can 
we attribute some modal force to contingent, law-like regularities? The answers to these questions 
reflect the distinction between nomological (or physical/natural) and metaphysical modality. As we 
will shortly see, there are good reasons to think that some of the best candidates for metaphysically 
necessary laws do indeed feature natural kinds. But it would be odd to deny the status of law to 
something like Coloumb’s law, which certainly expresses an important regularity in nature. 
Admittedly, this explanation calls for a further analysis of our epistemic access to the natures of 
kinds as well as metaphysically necessary laws – a task which I cannot hope to fully accomplish 
here. But even if these essentialist facts were to be considered brute facts, this view has its 
advantages over competitors (cf. Lowe 2006: 161). However, at this point it should be stressed that 
the type of view being developed here does not necessarily require a commitment to (Lowe-type) 
natural kind fundamentalism. It would be possible to develop a hybrid approach very similar to the 
one proposed here strictly in terms of, say, determinable magnitudes instead of fundamental natural 
kinds. For Lowe, it is important that we distinguish between fundamental determinable magnitudes 
(such as mass and charge) and fundamental natural kinds, but the former might make for a less 
scientifically controversial view as physics clearly deals with fundamental determinable 
magnitudes, but not so obviously with fundamental natural kinds. Nevertheless, here I will continue 
to develop the view based on natural kind fundamentalism, as this is an additional commitment that 
I am willing to make (and defend).14 
According to the proposed view, the apparent modal force of laws can be explained as 
follows. Some laws are metaphysically necessary because they feature natural kinds, but others are 
metaphysically contingent, law-like regularities, much like the Humean line suggests. The latter can 
also be said to have modal force, but only in the ‘soft’ sense that Bird attributes to the nomic 
necessitation approach, as opposed to the ‘hard’ sense of metaphysical modality (Bird 2005: 148). 
In fact, part of the reason why each of the competing views about laws has some appeal may be that 
typically the examples discussed by scientific/dispositional essentialists involve laws that are 
13 By ‘genuine’ natural kinds, I mean mind-independent or ‘joint-carving’ rather than conventional kinds. See also 
Lowe (2009: Ch. 9 and 12). However, the view being developed here does not entail that there must be only very 
few natural kinds – this is an upshot that I have examined elsewhere (Tahko forthcoming), based on issues 
concerning chemical kinds in particular. 
14  For further discussion regarding natural kinds, see Tahko forthcoming. I owe this insight to an anonymous referee 
for The Philosophical Quarterly. 
7 
                                                 
somewhat plausible candidates for metaphysically necessary laws, whereas the categoricalist view 
may be supported by citing cases where it appears to be relatively straightforward to come up with 
regularities different from the actual ones. 
 This sudden, even if only partial, agreement with the Humean may seem odd given that this 
paper started out with an explicit commitment to essentialism. The reason for this move is that even 
though the Humean may struggle to explain the ‘hard’ modal force of metaphysically necessary 
laws – of which there could be very few – it is enough, in the case of metaphysically contingent yet 
nomologically necessary laws, to explain the ‘soft’ modal force. Or, at any rate, there is an analysis 
in the vicinity of the Humean Best System Analysis which is capable of explaining nomological 
necessity in terms of natural properties rather than natural kinds. The appropriate distinction of laws 
and mere law-like regularities is hence tripartite: 
 
(1) Metaphysically necessary laws that feature fundamental natural kinds. 
(2) Nomologically necessary but metaphysically contingent laws that do not feature natural 
kinds (perhaps they feature natural properties instead). 
(3) Mere accidental, metaphysically and nomologically contingent regularities (not genuine 
laws). 
 
Are there any reasons to think that the proposed ‘hybrid’ view is correct? Consider, once 
again, the problematic status of Coulomb’s law. Bird (2001, 2002) has discussed it extensively in 
connection to his attempt to defend the view that (all) laws are metaphysically necessary: 
 
Given the existence of salt and water, Coulomb’s law of electrostatic attraction is 
sufficient to make the former dissolve in the latter. So any possible world in which salt 
failed to dissolve in water would be one in which Coulomb’s law is false. However, it is 
also the case that the existence of salt depends on Coulomb’s law. If Coulomb’s law is 
false then salt cannot exist. So there is no possible world in which salt exists and in which 
it does not dissolve in water. (Bird 2002: 257.) 
 
On the face of it, Coulomb’s law may appear to be a fairly good candidate for a metaphysically 
necessary law, but as we have seen, it is not clear how it could even be understood as a law from 
Lowe’s point of view. On the other hand, Beebee (2002) has challenged Bird’s analysis of 
Coulomb’s law, defending the Humean view according to which it must be contingent:15 
 
The fault in Bird’s argument is the assumption that other possible worlds work in a nice, 
orderly way. In particular, the argument assumes that for a law like Coulomb’s law to be 
false at a world wi, it has to be false in a nice, consistent, regular way. (Beebee 2002: 
254.) 
 
Beebee concludes, correctly it seems, that we can introduce some peculiar, disjunctive ‘law’ which 
enables the existence of salt in a world, but where Coulomb’s law is false. According to the view 
being developed here, this is exactly because Coulomb’s law does not feature a fundamental natural 
kind. In the following section, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the metaphysical 
contingency of some laws of type (2). 
 
15 Where wi is a world in which electrostatic attraction is, ‘necessarily, the force that exists (at wi) between charged 
objects in virtue of some law or other that takes values of charges and separation as input and F as output’ (Beebee 
2002: 253). 
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IV. CONTINGENT LAWS 
In order to motivate the proposed ‘hybrid’ view, we ought to find plausible cases of metaphysically 
contingent yet nomologically necessary laws on one hand, and metaphysically necessary laws on 
the other hand. Let us first examine whether some laws could be contingent.16 Beebee’s case for the 
contingency of Coulomb’s law notwithstanding, I believe that the best case for the contingency of 
laws will take advantage of empirical considerations. Recent discussion concerning fundamental 
physical constants and their possible variation over time is of interest in this regard. 
 It has been suggested that at least some of the fundamental physical constants vary over time 
(and even over space). Consider the fine structure constant (sometimes called the electromagnetic 
force coupling constant), α, which characterises the strength of the electromagnetic interaction, and 
the electron to proton mass ratio. Recent astrophysical observations of quasars appear to point 
towards variation of α over time.17 However, there are some experimental limitations in determining 
the variation of fundamental constants. In particular, if all the constants were to vary together so 
that their ratios would remain the same, it would presumably be impossible to establish this 
observationally. In any case, the case for α as a constant does not seem as firm as we once thought.  
Note that the fine structure constant is a dimensionless constant which is expressed in terms 
of other physical constants, namely the elementary charge, the electric constant, the Planck 
constant, and the speed of light. The numerical value of α-1 is just over 137. A change in a 
dimensionless constant implies that the proportions between constants have changed. There have 
been attempts to explain the change in the value of α in terms of a change in the value of the electric 
constant, but it has also been suggested that the speed of light could vary.18 Even a fairly modest 
change in a constant like α would have dramatic implications. The value of α-1 must lie somewhere 
between 180 and 85, or else protons will decay too rapidly, and the unification of fundamental 
forces (omitting gravitation of course, since it has not been unified with the other forces as of yet) 
will not be possible (Barrow 2001: 147). 
 So it seems that α may vary over time, but what of it? Well, I would suggest that actual 
variation over time constitutes at least prima facie evidence for variation over metaphysically 
possible worlds. That is, given the actual variation of α over time, it does not seem to be 
unreasonable to imagine, say, that α could’ve had a different initial value and perhaps also a 
different rate of change over time. If this is the case, then it would appear to be easy to imagine that 
the laws of nature that involve the fine structure constant could have been different – these include 
all laws that concern quantum electrodynamics and indeed the example we have already discussed, 
Coulomb’s law. Importantly, quantum electrodynamics applies to all electromagnetic phenomena 
associated with charged fundamental particles. Accordingly, the objection familiar from Bird (2012) 
could once again be applied, since a natural kind encompassing all charged fundamental particles 
would not seem to fit the Lowe-inspired ontology of natural kind fundamentalism that we have been 
working with. Yet, it seems unreasonable to deny the status of law for Coulomb’s law, and indeed 
all laws involving quantum electrodynamics, just because they do not involve natural kinds. These 
laws clearly capture important, presumably nomologically necessary regularities in nature, and the 
Humean analysis of such laws appears plausible in the face of empirical data. 
But is actual variation of α over time sufficient to establish variation of laws over possible 
worlds? One could at least object that simply the fact that α could have had a different value is not 
sufficient to establish that the laws of nature that it influences could have been different for the laws 
could be such that they allow for certain limited variation of α, perhaps roughly within the values 
mentioned above, i.e. between 1/180 and 1/85. Perhaps the fine structure constant could be tuned in 
such a manner that it must fall within a specific range in all metaphysically possible worlds, hence 
16 See also Lowe’s (2006: 169–71) case for the contingency of some laws. 
17  See Uzan (2003), and more recently Webb et al. (2011). There is still some debate about these results, but it seems 
that the variation of α over time is at least one possible explanation for the recent empirical results. 
18  See Kragh (2003) for some historical details. 
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the variation of α over time is part of what is in fact metaphysically necessary about the laws that it 
influences. A related line of thought has been explored by Marc Lange, who suggests that rather 
than being evidence for a ‘temporary law’, this type of variation over time is evidence for an 
‘eternal (albeit time-dependent) law’ (Lange 2008: 88). However, as Lange readily admits (2008: 
90, fn. 18), his argument for the immutability of laws is based on a specific analysis of the laws’ 
relation to counterfactuals, which will not be acceptable to everyone (e.g. Lewis). But Lange’s 
analysis is very much to the point given the present discussion: he argues that both in a Lewisian 
and in an Armstrongian analysis of laws, the immutability of laws over time must be brought in as 
an external element – if it is desired in the first place. Yet, this type of solution in the case at hand, it 
seems, would be based on a previous (ad hoc) commitment to the metaphysical necessity of the 
laws that α influences rather than any independent restrictions on the value of α. The burden of 
proof, I would insist, is on the necessitarian about laws. 
There are further complications. One of them concerns the typical but problematic 
assumption that individual laws could vary across metaphysically possible worlds. Lange’s analysis, 
which treats laws as a system, takes this into account: ‘The laws derive their lawhood collectively; 
their sub-nomic stability means that they are together as resilient under sub-nomic counterfactuals 
suppositions as they could together be. They form a unified, integrated whole—a system’ (Lange 
2011: 66). This is one reason why I am here focusing on a particular physical constant rather than a 
particular law – interfering with the fine structure constant will require changes throughout the 
system. The idea is that we should consider an alternative system entirely when dealing with the 
variation of laws over possible worlds. For Lange, this gives rise to ‘different grades of natural 
necessity’, which he contrasts with the flat picture defended by Ellis and Bird that associates a 
strong type of necessity (i.e. metaphysical necessity) with all laws (Lange 2011: 71). In contrast, the 
view being developed in this paper suggests that there are indeed different grades of necessity at 
play, but the crucial division is between natural and metaphysical necessity. 
 Let me recap the thought. If we have evidence of the time-dependence of some law, l (let us 
assume that l features the fine structure constant), then this constitutes at least a prima facie reason 
for thinking that l is metaphysically contingent. It does not guarantee that l is contingent – there is 
still room for l (as well as other laws in which constants such as α figure) to be structured in such a 
way that its time-dependence is metaphysically necessary, that is, happens at the exact same rate in 
all metaphysically possible worlds. But the phenomenon of time-dependence makes it exceedingly 
easy to conceive of scenarios where the rate of change is slightly different, where the initial value of 
α is slightly different, or indeed where α is truly constant (as physicists thought, until recently). I do 
not think that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility, but in this case the leap is not 
particularly drastic. Moreover, one might think that a time-dependent law is not a law at all, but I 
believe that this is a mistake: what if all laws turn out to be time-dependent? Even in that case, we 
would likely wish to salvage a sense of lawhood – perhaps it is simply overall theoretical 
consistency that constitutes a reason to consider time-dependent laws to be laws in the first place. 
Yet, such constraints do not obviously reach other possible worlds. So, it is at least arguable that 
laws in other possible worlds are more sensitive to variation over time and hence not obviously 
subject the same laws at all.19 
The upshot of this line of thought reflects Lange’s (2011: 72) reaction toward the 
dispositional/scientific essentialist’s case for the metaphysical necessity of laws. We may ask: why 
assume that all we need to explain the metaphysical necessity of laws governing the behaviour of 
charged particles is that it’s essential that two particles with opposite charges attract each other? In 
other words, even if the essentialist story is correct, it takes more to show that the relevant essences 
19  Thanks to Matti Eklund and Henrik Rydéhn for discussion on this point. As various commentators have pointed out, 
this argument is hardly conclusive. I certainly acknowledge this, and regret that I have little more to say in its 
defence at this time. The status of time-dependent laws with regard to variation over possible worlds is an interesting 
area for further research. 
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are capable of securing the necessity of the laws in which they feature. Moreover, unless there is 
more to the dispositional/scientific essentialist’s story, there is nothing in principle that prevents 
someone with Humean sympathies from thinking that some of the regularities we observe are 
metaphysically contingent, even if there were certain more ‘privileged’ laws featuring fundamental 
natural kinds that function more or less like the essentialist account suggests. 
 As an attempted rejoinder, the necessitarian about laws might suggest that the less 
privileged, metaphysically contingent laws must be grounded in some more fundamental, necessary 
laws and hence more fundamental natural kinds. Yet, the examples that we have been discussing 
based on the fine structure constant concern some of the seemingly most fundamental laws that we 
know of, such as the notorious Coulomb’s law. The electric constant, ε0, which features in 
Coulomb’s law, is as good a candidate for a fundamental physical constant as any, so it is difficult to 
see how the necessitarian could explain the variation of α unless some new physics helps to ground 
it in even more fundamental laws and kinds. 
 On the basis of the previous discussion, I take it that we have a fairly strong case against the 
view that all laws are metaphysically necessary. In fact, even the case for the necessity of any laws 
seems to face a serious obstacle, as the fine structure constant is crucial for a great number of 
supposed laws. One potential resolution is that nomologically necessary laws can take the form of 
boundary conditions for given constants, as was suggested above in terms of the fine structure 
constant. However, this is unlikely to be sufficient for ‘hard’ (metaphysically necessary) modal 
force because it appears that there could be metaphysically possible worlds where the same 
constants have radically different values and simply do not give rise to the same laws. But as has 
been suggested, those laws that feature natural kinds may fare better. 
 
V. NECESSARY LAWS 
The view being outlined here is sympathetic to certain aspects of Lowe’s analysis of laws, 
specifically the idea that laws may be best understood as facts about the natures of fundamental 
natural kinds, where ‘nature’ refers to the attributes of a kind of thing (see Lowe 2006: 173). 
However, where the view differs from Lowe’s is in claiming that not all laws must feature natural 
kinds. Indeed, it is consistent with (although not entailed by) the view that only very few laws 
feature natural kinds. The laws that do feature natural kinds have a privileged status: they are 
metaphysically necessary. This idea, combined with the previous case against the metaphysical 
necessity of some or even most laws, suggests that the attributes of a given kind of thing may only 
rarely be essential to the kind, especially in complex cases. Lowe himself considers the law that 
‘electrons have a unit negative charge’ a plausible candidate for a necessary law, since it involves an 
elementary particle. In general, his idea seems to be that the simpler the kind in question, the more 
likely it is that all or most of its attributes are essential to it. This strategy is hardly conclusive 
without a full theory of natural kinds, but constructing such a theory is beyond the scope of the 
present paper (but see Tahko forthcoming). However, those who are sceptical about the existence of 
any genuine natural kinds may consider the claim to be conditional. That is, the case for 
metaphysically necessary laws becomes conditional on the existence of genuine natural kinds: 
 
(COND-MET) If there are genuine natural kinds, any law which features only such kinds is 
metaphysically necessary. Furthermore, only those laws which feature genuine kinds are 
metaphysically necessary. 
 
 It will not be possible to offer a conclusive case in favour of (COND-MET) here. What can 
be offered is a further case study, as above, with regard to contingent laws. These case studies are 
neither sufficient to establish that laws that involve genuine natural kinds are always metaphysically 
necessary nor sufficient to establish that laws that do not involve genuine natural kinds are never 
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metaphysically necessary. But what they do establish is that some sort of a hybrid view is likely to 
be correct. (COND-MET) is a speculative explanation regarding the ontological basis of this hybrid 
view. 
 The case study in favour of the metaphysical necessity of laws is already familiar to us: the 
Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP) and fermions – which are featured in the principle – make for a 
plausible candidate.20 Recall what the PEP states: if we have two identical and indistinguishable 
electrons (or other fermions) in a closed system, the wavefunction for the system of those two 
electrons must be anti-symmetric. Electrons occupy successively higher orbitals to prevent a shared 
quantum state, hence not all electrons can collapse to the lowest orbital. It is a property of any 
closed system, such as an atom, that any two electrons in that closed system do not have the same 
set of the four quantum numbers. When the conception of laws at hand is applied to this case, a 
plausible way to understand the PEP is in terms of the attributes of electrons and other fermions. In 
particular, it is part of the nature of fermions that they behave in a manner that is constrained by the 
PEP. This may be the result of a combination of the modal constraints that particular attributes of 
fermions – such as their half-integer spin – have. The role of spin is highlighted by the fact that 
particles of half-integer spin must have anti-symmetric wavefunctions, whereas particles of integer 
spin must have symmetric wavefunctions. The latter, bosons, are not subject to the PEP.21  
Clearly, the fact that the behaviour of fermions is constrained by the PEP is at least partly 
due to their half-integer spin, given that in the view under consideration, metaphysically necessary 
laws are simply facts about the natures of natural kinds. It is also plausible that half-integer spin is 
essential for fermions, since it is what differentiates them from bosons; the behaviour of fermions 
and bosons is radically different, especially at low temperatures. If Lowe (2006: 169–70) is right 
about how simple kinds and their attributes are linked, this would suggest that both fermions and 
bosons have most of their attributes essentially, that is, they depend for their existence and identity 
on these attributes. Hence, both would be likely candidates for genuine kinds. But recall that the 
present argument (based on (COND-MET)) is only conditional – the real battle for natural kinds 
will have to take place elsewhere. 
In light of the above, the PEP is one plausible candidate – the most plausible that I have been 
able to come up with – for a metaphysically necessary law of nature, even though I do not claim to 
have conclusively demonstrated this. However, even if the PEP itself did not hold by metaphysical 
necessity, some law very similar to it would likely be necessary as any binding behaviour, or indeed 
the stability of matter, would seem to require something like the PEP. Of course, if a universe with 
no binding behaviour is metaphysically possible, then this might serve as a counterexample – at 
least there would presumably be no complex kinds in such a universe.22 But that would be an odd 
universe indeed: to serve as a counterexample, it should contain fermions. If what was said above 
about PEP was correct, then these fermions would have to lack features like half-integer spin, since 
features like half-integer spin entail modal constraints such as the one that the PEP states. However, 
these are the very constraints that enable binding behaviour in the first place. To all ends and 
purposes, then, those odd fermions would appear to behave like – and be indistinguishable from – 
bosons. A universe with no binding behaviour is plausibly a universe with no fermions, and a 
universe with no fermions is not a valid counterexample to the metaphysical necessity of the PEP, 
since it does not contain the natural kind featured in the PEP.23 This corroborates (COND-MET). 
20  Here the focus is on reasons for thinking that PEP is metaphysically necessary. For further evidence on why it must 
feature a genuine natural kind, see Tahko 2012. 
21  It is, however, not implausible that bosons as well constitute a genuine natural kind. Accordingly, there may be 
different metaphysically necessary laws featuring bosons. 
22  By this I do not mean an absolutely empty universe, whether or not such a universe is metaphysically possible. An 
empty universe would not be a suitable counterexample because it would also lack anything that could be 
constrained by the PEP. More generally, if we understand laws as facts about the natures of natural kinds, then 
possible worlds where the kind does not exist are not viable counterexamples. 
23  We could perhaps say that the PEP is vacuously true in such worlds. 
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Of course, there is an obvious caveat here: the argument constructed above assumes anti-
quidditism – the view that the identity of properties is not brute – at least in the case of fermions. If 
there are metaphysically possible worlds with fermions* that are not constrained by some analogue 
of the PEP and hence fail to fill the causal role of the actual fermions, then only a quidditist would 
have the tools to identify fermions and fermions*. However, I consider the burden of proof to be 
strictly on the quidditist – and here I am surely with the majority (e.g. Mumford 2004: 104). 
Moreover, since I have adopted a type of essentialist approach in the first place, I would hope that 
this justifies asserting anti-quidditism in the case of fermions, even if I do acknowledge the need to 
defend this assumption in more detail. Anti-quidditism may beg the question against the Humean, 
but this should be excusable given the dialectic of the paper. In particular, if the view is understood 
as a type of ‘weak’ dispositional essentialism, then it is intimately connected to anti-quidditism at 
the outset. As Hendry and Rowbottom put it when outlining their ‘permissive’ dispositional 
essentialism, ‘if the modal intuitions concerning quiddities and counternomic situations have some 
pull, however weak, a position that honours them will have an advantage over both quidditism and 
strict dispositional essentialism’ (Hendry and Rowbottom 2009: 672). 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is a theoretical advantage of the view that I have outlined that no single case can refute it. If we 
acknowledge that some laws are metaphysically necessary, but not all of them (and if we are 
fallibilist about which laws are necessary and which ones are not), then it is possible to agree with 
the scientific/dispositional essentialist about some cases and with various Humeans about others. 
We can even change our minds about specific cases as new evidence emerges. This conception 
about the status of laws is no doubt closer to the scientific/dispositional essentialist view, but it is 
truly a hybrid view, and the manner in which I have laid it out – by assuming a type of essentialist 
position and natural kind fundamentalism – is by no means the only possibility. To motivate this 
view, it was suggested that we have good reasons to think that some laws are metaphysically 
necessary, whereas some laws are metaphysically contingent yet nomologically necessary. This is 
enough to cause trouble both for the Humean about laws as well as the scientific/dispositional 
essentialist view – at least in their strongest form – since the former regards all laws as 
metaphysically contingent, whereas the latter generally regards all laws as metaphysically 
necessary. 
 Before concluding, one objection should be anticipated. If the preceding line of thought is 
correct, it might be argued that no reason has been given to consider metaphysically contingent laws 
to be laws at all. Why shouldn’t we just say that all laws are metaphysically necessary – because 
they feature natural kinds – and what remains are not genuine laws, whether nomologically 
necessary or not? Indeed, the view at hand does suggest that there is an ontological difference 
between metaphysically contingent and metaphysically necessary laws. There is no reason to 
consider this approach to be ‘untidy’, in contrast to Bird, since the difference between these two 
classes of laws can be explained in virtue of their source. But the metaphysically contingent laws 
may certainly be called something else than laws if one so wishes. Perhaps better, we could call 
contingent laws weak and necessary laws strong, reflecting their modal force and applicability – I 
prefer these labels to Bird’s ‘soft’ and ‘hard’. 
 The resulting view, that some laws are metaphysically contingent and some necessary, is 
perhaps easier to accept for a scientific/dispositional essentialist, since the view does still hold that 
metaphysically necessary laws emerge from the natures or essences of kinds. Hence, even if there 
were only very few metaphysically necessary laws of nature, it is in fact the source of the modal 
constraints imposed by laws that is at issue here. Since the proponents of HS and nomic 
necessitation deny that there could be any immanent modality involved in laws, they have no easy 
way to account for the source of these modal constraints in the case of metaphysically necessary 
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laws. The case of the Pauli Exclusion Principle demonstrates that at least some laws do appear to 
impose modal constraints of the metaphysical sort – insofar as they feature genuine natural kinds.24 
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